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1 Introduction
The August 2002 flood in the Elbe basin was a showcase of a flood event, with esti-
mated damage costs of approximately US$ 12 billion (Becker and Gru¨newald, 2003).
The Elbe flood, jointly with other severe floods in Europe, provided a stimulus to two
ongoing scientific debates. The first debate takes place among hydrologists and concerns
historical observations and future projections of flood frequency, and its relation to the
possible impacts of climate change on river flow. The second debate takes place among
river basin decision-makers and concerns the need for additional (adaptive) investments
in flood protection measures. In this paper we link the two debates in a model that as-
sesses optimal investments in flood protection measures under uncertain climate change
impacts on flood risk.
There is mixed evidence on the impact of climate change on flood risk and extreme
flood events in river basins. On the one hand, Petrow and Merz (2009) analysed his-
torical observations for different river basins in Germany for the period 1951-2002, and
concluded that a large share of these basins show significant upward flood trends, and
Milly et al. (2002) showed “significant trends towards more extreme flood events” in 29
basins. On the other hand, Mudelsee et al. (2003) analysed flood frequency in the Oder
and Elbe rivers and concluded that “although extreme floods with return periods of 100
year and more occurred in central Europe in July 1997 (Oder) and August 2002 (Elbe),
there is no evidence from the observations for recent upward trends in their occurrence
rate”. Kundzewicz et al. (2005) found varying results, with “increases, decreases as well
as no significant long-term changes in annual extreme flows” for a sample of 195 rivers
(Trenberth et al., 2007). The same ambiguity is present in projections of climate change
effects on flood frequency. The frequency of flood events is influenced by, among others,
precipitation intensity and the discharge regime, both of which might be affected by cli-
mate change. It is unclear, however, to what extent climate change will affect extreme
peak discharges, which under normal circumstances result in flood events. Climate mod-
els generally project changes in seasonal average discharge regimes of rivers, with higher
discharges in winter and lower discharges in summer (Te Linde et al., 2008). In addition,
these models project an overall decrease in precipitation in Europe, although flooding
may well become more frequent in summertime (Christensen and Christensen, 2003).
These types of projections, however, have to be used with care as they are not supported
by historic flooding trends (Helms et al., 2002; Mudelsee et al., 2003), are typically made
at scales that are larger than those relevant for decision-making (Towler et al., 2010),
and it remains difficult to link individual extreme weather events to a change in the
2
CICERO Working Paper 2012:01
climate (Kundzewicz, 2005; Trenberth et al., 2007).
Thus, there exists uncertainty about the impact of climate change on flood risk in river
basins. Therefore, the relevant question for decision-makers responsible for flood protec-
tion is how to deal with this uncertainty. In response to the 2002 flood, decision-makers
in the Elbe basin started to adapt their flood protection infrastructure. Relevant flood
protection measures were identified, including increased storage capacity in upstream
reservoirs and upgrading of the existing river dikes (De Kok and Grossmann, 2010).
The implementation of these measures remains uncertain, however, most likely because
this requires long-term political commitment (Petrow et al., 2006). In the Netherlands,
flood events in the Meuse and Rhine basins in the 1990s resulted in a similar upgrading
of the flood protection programme, although uncertainty about climate change effects
remains (Silva et al., 2004).
These examples illustrate that the relation between uncertainty and the timing of invest-
ments in flood protection measures presents decision-makers with a trade-off between
investing in flood protection today and postponing the decision. Because the effects of
climate change are uncertain, decision-makers are reluctant to invest in additional flood
protection measures, especially when the costs of these measures are irreversible. When
the timing of investment in flood protection measures is flexible, the investment deci-
sions may be postponed until more information about the effects of climate change has
arrived. The presence of both irreversibility and flexibility link this decision problem to
the theory of investment under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
Only few studies relate the risk of flooding in river basins to the implementation of adap-
tive protection measures. Fankhauser et al. (1999) assess efficient adaptation to climate
change-induced extreme events. Kundzewicz (2009) identifies flood protection and flood
preparedness measures to avoid adverse impacts for the Baltic Sea basin. De Bruin
et al. (2009) present an inventory and ranking of adaptation options for the water sector
in the Netherlands. Tol et al. (2003) discuss the impacts of climate change on flood
risks in the Netherlands and conclude that structural solutions that integrate land-use
planning and water management are better capable of dealing with climate change than
incidental solutions. The previous studies did not consider different adaptation measures
under climate change uncertainty. In this paper we address flood risk in river basins and
investment decisions in adaptation measures. We make a distinction between different
types of protection measures and model the resolution of climate change uncertainty.
Our objective is to show how climate change uncertainty affects the decision to invest in
3
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flood protection measures. We develop a model of optimal investment in flood protection
measures under climate change uncertainty. Such a model allows decision-makers to cope
with the uncertain impacts of climate change on the frequency and damage of river flood
events, while minimising the risk of under- or over-investment. Under-investment results
in a flood damage probability that is higher than optimal, while over-investment leads
to sunk costs and redundant flood protection capacity.
We adapt a model by Hennessy and Moschini (2006) on costly regulatory action under
scientific uncertainty to the case of flood protection. Our simplest model specification
is a discrete-state two-period model which provides a crude first decision-rule for invest-
ments. In subsequent sections, this model is extended to a continuous-state two-period
and three-period model, which allows us to analyse the effects of various model elements
on this decision-rule. One of these elements is the trade-off between investment in struc-
tural and non-structural measures, explained below. Another element is the resolution
of climate change uncertainty, which is modeled as a gradual process over time until full
resolution is reached. In the two-period model the initial investment decision can be
updated when full resolution of uncertainty is reached at an unknown future moment in
time. The three-period model allows for an intermediate investment decision under par-
tial resolution of uncertainty before the adjustment of the investment decision under full
resolution of climate change uncertainty, related to evidence on climate induced annual
flood damage. The motivation for studying gradual resolution of uncertainty is that over
time, additional evidence adds to the overall insight into these impacts, reducing their
uncertainty. Our results show that the effect of uncertainty on the investment decision
depends on the cost structure of the flood protection measures under consideration. To
be precise, a combination of the discount rate, climate change uncertainty, and the cost
structure of structural and non-structural measures determines the optimal mix of in-
vestments in these measures. A higher level of annual flood damage and later resolution
of uncertainty in time increases the optimal investment decision. Furthermore, the op-
timal investment decision today is influenced by the possibility of the decision-maker to
adjust his decision at a future moment in time.
One of the innovative elements of our paper is that we explicitly distinguish between two
categories of protection measures, which vary in their cost structure. The first category,
that we will refer to as structural measures, includes those measures that have high
fixed costs relative to annual costs. Examples are dike improvement and relocation.
The second category, that we will refer to as non-structural measures, includes those
measures that have low fixed costs relative to annual costs. Examples are the creation of
4
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retention areas to accommodate peak flows, and programmes to raise public awareness
on flood events. Note that our definition of structural and non-structural measures
is slightly different from the one used by for instance Kundzewicz (2002, 2009), see
Section 5. We will see that the inclusion of an intermediate decision moment where
partial resolution is observed induces lower investments in structural measures.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic elements of our
model to establish the optimal investment decision under uncertainty in a discrete two-
period model. In Section 3 we relax the discreteness assumption as to allow for a wide
range of possible climate change impacts as well as a continuous range of investment
in both structural and non-structural measures. In Section 4 we introduce a three-
period model, in order to analyse the effect of an intermediate investment decision under
partial resolution of uncertainty. The implications of the models for flood protection are
discussed in Section 5, followed by the conclusion in Section 6.
2 Discrete-state two-period model
In this section we present a simple discrete-state, two-period model, inspired by Hennessy
and Moschini (2006). We assume that the world knows two possible states α; either
climate change affects flood damage (α = 1) or it does not (α = 0). At time t = 0
there is uncertainty about which of the two states is the real state. State α = 1 has
probability q, and state α = 0 has probability 1 − q. This uncertainty will be resolved
at some unknown future time t = κ > 0, where κ is exponentially distributed with
f(κ) = he−hκ, such that E[κ] = 1/h, where h is the hazard rate. A lower value of h
implies that the expected resolution of uncertainty is further away in the future. An
exponential distribution is often used in the R&D literature to model the expected arrival
time of new information (Choi, 1991; Malueg and Tsutsui, 1997). It is a memoryless
distribution, which means that the probability of arrival of new information does not
depend on the arrival of past information. Following Hennessy and Moschini (2006),
we further assume that new information is free and the arrival date is considered to be
exogenous to the decision-maker.
The problem faced by the decision-maker is whether or not to make an irreversible and
costly investment in flood protection measures m, that suffices to prevent damage in case
α = 1. Two actions are possible: m = 1 denotes the decision to invest and m = 0 the
decision not to invest. In this section, we simplify matters by assuming that investment
induces a fixed and irreversible investment cost C and that the flood protection measure
5
CICERO Working Paper 2012:01
has an infinite lifetime. Annual costs of the flood protection measure c include for
instance opportunity costs (e.g. for land used as retention area) and maintenance costs
(e.g. for dike maintenance). Let Dmax denote maximum annual damage from climate
change over the period up to t = κ. Damage is for instance caused by overflow, where
at a certain location peak flow exceeds the critical height of the dike.
We assume that the decision-maker chooses the value of m that minimizes expected
costs. The discounted realised cost is denoted as R(m0, α, κ), where m0 is the selected
measure at time t = 0, α is the realized state of nature and κ is the time at which
uncertainty is resolved. Costs consist of investment (C) and annual costs (c) of the
implemented measure as well as damage costs D. For simplicity, α and m are the
result of the normalisation of the ratio of the increase of flood damage due to climate
change (A) and decrease of flood damage due to investment in flood protection measure
(M), both in monetary units, with the maximum annual flood damage (Dmax), where
α = A/Dmax, and m = M/Dmax.
t = 0 t = κ
m0 = 1
α = 1 R(m0 = 1,α = 1,κ)
α = 0 R(m0 = 1,α = 0,κ)
R(m0 = 0,α = 0,κ)
m0 = 0
α = 0
α = 1
R(m0 = 0,α = 1,κ)
Figure 1: Decision tree for the discrete-state two-period model.
The decision-maker may make two erroneous decisions (Figure 1). First, if the decision-
maker chooses m0 = 0 and it turns out that at t = κ, α = 1, he can revert his initial
decision and invest mκ = 1, while having incurred damage D over the period from t = 0
to t = κ. Second, if the decision-maker chooses m0 = 1 and it turns out that at t = κ,
α = 0, he cannot retrieve his initial investment (i.e. C is irreversible), but saves annual
costs c from time t = κ onward.
Costs are evaluated at t = 0 present values, using the continuous-time discount rate r.
6
CICERO Working Paper 2012:01
The decision node, represented as a square in Figure 1, indicates the decision to invest
or not to invest at t = 0. The information node, shown as a circle, indicates the
arrival of new information, in this situation leading to the full resolution of climate
change uncertainty. The outcome of each path through the decision tree is defined is
the discounted stream of costs for each specific path. The discounted realised cost is
a function of m0 and the random variables α and κ. The two random variables are
independent. The outcome of each path is specified as:
R(m0 = 1, α = 1, κ) = C +
∫ ∞
0
ce−rtdt
R(m0 = 1, α = 0, κ) = C +
∫ κ
0
ce−rtdt
R(m0 = 0, α = 1, κ) =
∫ κ
0
Dmaxe
−rtdt+ Ce−rκ +
∫ ∞
κ
ce−rtdt
R(m0 = 0, α = 0, κ) = 0 (1)
The expected cost of investing, E[R(m0 = 1)], and of not investing, E[R(m0 = 0)], can
be expressed as a function of the two random variables α and κ, where α is a discrete
random variable, and κ a continuous random variable.
E[R(m0 = 1)] =
∫ ∞
0
[qR(m0 = 1, α = 1, κ) + (1− q)R(m0 = 1, α = 0, κ)] f(κ)dκ
= C + q
( c
r
)
+ (1− q)
(
c
r + h
)
E[R(m0 = 0)] =
∫ ∞
0
[qR(m0 = 0, α = 1, κ) + (1− q)R(m0 = 0, α = 0, κ)] f(κ)dκ
= q
(
c
r
+
Dmax − c+ hC
r + h
)
(2)
Comparing the expected costs, investment at t = 0 is optimal if E[R(m0 = 1)] <
E[R(m0 = 0)], which is equivalent to q¯ < q, where:
q¯ =
c+ C(r + h)
Dmax + Ch
(3)
Because ∂q¯/∂C > 0 and ∂q¯/∂c > 0, investing at t = 0 is less likely if investment costs
(fixed and/or annual) are higher. When the expected resolution of uncertainty moves
closer in time (i.e. h increases) or the discount rate r increases, investing at t = 0 also
becomes less likely, as the decision-maker prefers to postpone the uncertain decision until
uncertainty is resolved. However, when the damage costs increase, investing at t = 0
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becomes more likely; the decision-maker faces higher expected costs when postponing his
investment decision. The results are intuitive and the model set-up is rather simple. For
instance, the uncertainty of climate change impacts on flood damage α should preferably
not be modeled as a draw from only two possible states of the world. Therefore, we
introduce state-continuity of this impact and other model features in the next section,
which also allows us to distinguish between investing in structural and non-structural
measures.
3 Continuous-state two-period model
The continuous-state model is derived by three major adjustments to the discrete model.
First, instead of the discrete set of states of nature α ∈ {0, 1}, we now assume a contin-
uum of states of nature α ∈ [0, 1], which has a density function f(α) over its domain. The
interval [0, 1] reflects the possible states of nature of how climate change affects expected
flood damage as explained below. As before, at t = 0 the value of α is unknown.
Second, we introduce structural measures s and non-structural measures n. These flood
protection measures serve to mitigate the increase of flood damage and thus the expected
flood damage caused by climate change. Instead of the discrete investment decision
m ∈ {0, 1}, we now assume a continuum of structural and non-structural flood protection
measures with s ∈ [0, 1] and n ∈ [0, 1], where s and n are the result of normalisation
such that s = 0 or n = 0 reflects no investment while s = 1 or n = 1 reflects maximum
investment. We assume that each combination of measures suffices to adapt to the
impacts of climate change if s + n ≥ α. This assumption implies that structural and
non-structural measures are additive, as in the case where dike heightening (structural
measure) is accompanied by an early-warning system (non-structural).
The variables α, s and n are the result of normalisation based on the variable A that
denotes the increase in potential flood damage due to climate change, and S and N that
denote the decrease of flood damage due to investment in structural and non-structural
measures, all defined in monetary units. These variables have been normalised by taking
ratios using the maximum annual flood damage (Dmax), which leads to s = S/Dmax,
n = N/Dmax, and α = A/Dmax. Thus the inequality S+N ≥ A is normalised by taking
ratios using the maximum annual flood damage, leading to s+ n ≥ α.
Costs of the measures reflect the differences between structural and non-structural mea-
sures as discussed in Section 1. Structural measures have irreversible fixed costs Css
and annual costs css. Similarly, non-structural measures have irreversible fixed costs
8
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Cnn and annual costs cnn. We assume Cs > Cn but cs < cn. Structural measures have
high fixed costs but low annual costs relative to non-structural measures. From this cost
structure we can derive that, in absence of uncertainty and for sufficiently low discount-
ing, structural measures are preferred over non-structural measures. Under uncertainty,
however, a decision-maker may want to diversify between structural and non-structural
measures in order to minimise total expected costs.
Third, instead of the fixed damage parameter Dmax, we now assume a damage function
D(α, s, n) that maps damage as a function of uncertain climate change impact α, miti-
gated by flood protection measures s+n. Recall that we assumed that each combination
of measures suffices to adapt to the impacts of climate change if s+n ≥ α, which leads to
zero damage costs. This assumption allows us to use the difference between α and s+n
in order to account for the mitigating effect of flood protection measures on damage.
These three adjustments to the discrete model allow us to model the decision-maker’s
decision in a similar way as was done for the discrete case described in Section 2. Again,
the decision-maker may make two erroneous decisions: First, if it turns out that at t = κ
the decision-maker has under-invested (i.e. s0 + n0 < α),
1 he can upgrade his initially
implemented measures to the optimal level (i.e. to s0 +n0 +sκ+nκ = α), while incurring
the possible additional fixed costs Cssκ or Cnnκ, and increase of annual costs by cssκ or
cnnκ. Obviously, damage is incurred over the period from t = 0 to t = κ. Second, if it
turns out that at t = κ the decision-maker has over-invested (i.e. s0 +n0 > α), he cannot
retrieve his initial investment (i.e. Css0 and Cnn0 are irreversible), but he can reduce
his annual costs such that s0 + n0 + sκ + nκ = α from time t = κ onward. The interval
range for s0 and n0 is from [0, 1], and the interval range for sκ and nκ is from [−s0, 1]
and [−n0, 1]. The constraints sκ ≥ −s0 and nκ ≥ −n0 are imposed on the interval range
of sκ and nκ to indicate that in the case of over-investment at t = 0, a reduction of the
annual costs at t = κ cannot exceed the initial investment made at t = 0.
Figure 2 shows the decision tree for the continuous-state two-period model. The decision
problem is solved backward. The decision node (square) on the right indicates the
decision for sκ and nκ at t = κ when a combination of s0 and n0 has been chosen
and α is known (represented by the circular information node). We assume the optimal
adjustment of the investment decision under full resolution of uncertainty at t = κ,
where
sκ + nκ = α− s0 − n0 (4)
1Where necessary, we add a subscript t (t = 0 or t = κ) to s or n, in order to clarify the timing of
the investment.
9
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We first define the adjustment decision for the level of sκ and then, given this choice,
the investment level of nκ, where
nκ = α− s0 − n0 − sκ (5)
is set. This allows us to substitute nκ by α − sκ − s0 − n0, and therefore leave out the
term nκ in the decision tree and continuation of the model description. First, we solve
the decision-maker’s problem to choose sκ at time t = κ, when s0 and n0 have been
chosen and α is known. The decision for sκ is based on the minimisation over all possible
values of sκ (represented by a range of possible values from 1 to M) given the constraint
sκ ≥ −s0. Second, given the choice at t = κ, the optimal levels of s0 and n0 are selected
at t = 0. As we evaluate the costs from a t = 0 perspective, we consider a continuum of
α, as at t = 0 we do not know the exact value of α at t = κ. The continuum over α is
represented in Figure 2 by different regions to indicate how the combination of s0 and
n0 and the value of α affects the optimal choice at t = κ (see Figure 2).
The decision node on the left represents the objective of the decision-maker to choose
the combination of s0 and n0 in order to minimise the path outcome of the decision
tree, the discounted realised cost R(s0, n0, sκ, κ, α) that consists of damage, fixed and
annual costs of the flood protection measures. For each combination of s0 and n0 and
associated choice at t = κ, the discounted realised cost is derived. The superscripts in
Figure 2 and further equations indicate over which set of choices the discounted realised
cost is derived; the set of {s0, n0} combinations is defined from 1 to N . The set of
{s0, n0} combinations includes all combinations based on the interval range of s0 and
n0. The set for {sκ} ranges from 1 to M , and is based on the interval [−s0, α − s0].
The lower and upper bound of the interval are based on the constraint sκ ≥ −s0 and
nκ ≥ −n0, where the latter constraint can be rewritten in the following way. Note that
nκ ≥ −n0, by substituting nκ by Eq. 5, can be written as α−s0−sκ ≥ 0, which is equal
to α− s0 ≥ sκ, and presents the upper-bound of the interval for sκ.
3.1 Specific decision path
We now highlight a specific path of the decision tree that leads to the outcome Rij to
indicate how the discounted realised cost is derived. The stream of costs is discounted
for a specific {s0, n0}i, {sκ}j , α and κ. The discounted realised cost Rij is defined as
Rij = Ii0 +D
i
0 + I
ij
κ (6)
10
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{s0,n0}1
{s0,n0}2
{s0,n0}i
{s0,n0}N‐1
{s0,n0}N
Rij
t = 0 t = κ
α = 1
α = 0
α = si0 + ni0
α = si0
{sK}1
{sK}2
{sK}j
{sK}M‐1
{sK}M
Figure 2: Decision tree for continuous-state two-period model.
which includes the discounted investment cost and discounted damage cost for the period
starting at t = 0 (Ii0 and D
i
0) and the discounted adjustment cost for the period starting
at t = κ (Iijκ ).2 The damage cost from t = κ onwards is zero as we assume optimal
investment adjustment at t = κ. The discounted investment cost Ii0 is a function of a
combination of {s0, n0}i and random variable κ:
Ii0 = Css
i
0 + Cnn
i
0 +
∫ κ
0
(
css
i
0 + cnn
i
0
)
e−rtdt
= Css
i
0 + Cnn
i
0 +
(
css
i
0 + cnn
i
0
r
)
(1− e−rκ) (7)
The discounted damage cost Di0 is a function of a combination of {s0, n0}i and random
variables κ and α:
Di0 =
∫ κ
0
D(α, si0, ni0)e−rtdt
=
D(α, si0, ni0)
r
(1− e−rκ) (8)
The discounted adjustment cost Iijκ is a function of {s0, n0}i, {sκ}j and random variables
2The superscript ij refers to a combination of {s0, n0}i and {sκ}j to calculate the discounted adjust-
ment cost for the period starting at t = κ.
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κ and α:
Iijκ =
(
Cs max
{
0, sjκ
}
+ Cn max
{
0, α− si0 − ni0 − sjκ
})
e−rκ
+
∫ ∞
κ
(
cs
(
si0 + s
j
κ
)
+ cn
(
α− si0 − sjκ
))
e−rtdt
=
(
Cs max
{
0, sjκ
}
+ Cn max
{
0, α− si0 − ni0 − sjκ
})
e−rκ
+
(cs
r
(si0 + s
j
κ) +
cn
r
(
α− si0 − sjκ
))
e−rκ (9)
Note that si0 + s
j
κ ≥ 0 and ni0 + njκ ≥ 0.
3.2 Optimal adjustment at t = κ
As we follow a backward procedure, the focus is first on the optimal adjustment decision
at t = κ, denoted as {sκ, nκ}jmin , which is defined as the decision where the discounted
adjustment cost is minimum, i.e. Iijminκ . Therefore, I
ij
κ is minimised over all possible
values of {sκ}j for a given {s0, n0}i and α.
We rewrite Eq. 9 as Iijκ = A
ij
κ e−rκ, where Aijκ represents the flow of fixed and annual
costs and is defined as
Aijκ = Cs max
{
0, sjκ
}
+ Cn max
{
0, α− si0 − ni0 − sjκ
}
+
cs
r
(si0 + s
j
κ) +
cn
r
(α− si0 − sjκ) (10)
The minimum Aijκ can be written as a function of C1 and C2, where C1 and C2 are defined
as:
C1 = Cs + cs
r
− cn
r
C2 = Cs + cs
r
− Cn − cn
r
(11)
The magnitudes of C1 and C2 are determined by the value and ratio of the fixed and
annual cost elements between the structural and non-structural measure and the level
of the discount rate r.3
There are three possible combinations for C1 and C2, namely: (1) C1 < 0 and C2 < 0, (2)
C1 ≥ 0 and C2 < 0 and (3) C1 ≥ 0 and C2 ≥ 0. Note that the combination C1 < 0 and
C2 ≥ 0 is not valid, as C2 cannot be positive if C1 is negative, given that Cn > 0.
3We define Cs + cs/r as the fixed plus weighted annual cost. The weighted annual cost is the present
value of the infinite stream of annual costs.
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For each combination of C1 and C2, the minimum Aijκ is defined by how the level of α
relates to the investment decision made at t = 0, {s0, n0}i, i.e. if the decision-maker has
over- or under-invested. This can be summarized as follows:
1. C1 < 0 and C2 < 0
Aijminκ =

cs
r α 0 ≤ α ≤ si0
Cs(α− si0) + csr α si0 < α ≤ si0 + ni0
Cs(α− si0) + csr α si0 + ni0 < α ≤ 1
(12)
2. C1 ≥ 0 and C2 < 0
Aijminκ =

cs
r α 0 ≤ α ≤ si0
cs
r s
i
0 +
cn
r (α− si0) si0 < α ≤ si0 + ni0
Cs(α− si0 − ni0) + csr (α− ni0) + cnr ni0 si0 + ni0 < α ≤ 1
(13)
3. C1 ≥ 0 and C2 ≥ 0
Aijminκ =

cs
r α 0 ≤ α ≤ si0
cs
r s
i
0 +
cn
r (α− si0) si0 < α ≤ si0 + ni0
Cn(α− si0 − ni0) + csr si0 + cnr (α− ni0) si0 + ni0 < α ≤ 1
(14)
Each combination of C1 and C2 marks a different adjustment strategy. Since C1 and C2
are a function of the discount rate (r), three regions of adjustment types can be defined
along the discount rate axis. This is shown in Figure 3 for the cases where the decision-
maker has over- and under-invested. r1 denotes the discount rate where C1 = 0, and
thus if r < r1 then C1 < 0. r2 denotes the discount rate where C2 = 0, and thus if r < r2
then C2 < 0. Investments in structural measures are indicated with a light gray bar,
and non-structural measures with a dark gray bar.
If C1 < 0 then Cs + csr < cnr , i.e. the fixed cost plus the present value of an infinite
stream of the annual costs of the structural measure is smaller than the present value of
an infinite stream of the annual cost of the non-structural measure. Moreover, if C2 < 0
then Cs+
cs
r < Cn+
cn
r , i.e. the fixed plus weighted annual cost of the structural measure
is smaller than the fixed plus weighted annual cost of the non-structural measure. C2
determines the choice between structural and non-structural measures if the decision-
maker has under-invested at t = 0 and therefore an additional investment is required at
t = κ. C1 determines whether the non-structural measures are reduced if the decision-
maker has over-invested at t = 0 or if they are replaced by an investment in structural
measures.
For example, if C1 < 0 and C2 < 0 then the optimal adjustment decision at t = κ is to
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reduce the investment in the non-structural measures as much as possible, i.e. njκ = −ni0.
Moreover, if 0 ≤ α ≤ si0, the decision-maker has over-invested at t = 0. Even after
reducing the non-structural measures at t = κ, there is still an over-investment. The
structural measures are therefore reduced: sjκ = α − si0. Reducing structural measures
leads to a reduction in the annual costs, but it does not imply that the initial investment
is removed. If si0 < α ≤ si0 + ni0, the decision-maker has over-invested at t = 0. After
reducing the non-structural measures, an additional investment is however required to
avoid damages. He will invest in structural measures sjκ = α − si0. On the other hand,
if si0 + n
i
0 < α ≤ 1 the decision-maker has under-invested, there are damages incurred
up to t = κ. He will further invest only in structural measures sjκ = α − si0. Inserting
these conditions in Eq. 10 gives Eq. 12.
1/h=∞
r2
s=0 s≥0
n=0  n≥0
r1 r2
sκ= α‐s0
nκ= ‐n0
sκ= α‐s0‐n0
nκ= 0 
sκ= 0 
nκ= α‐s0‐n0
r1 r2
sκ= α‐s0
nκ= ‐n0
sκ= 0
nκ= α‐s0‐n0
sκ= 0
nκ= α‐s0‐n0
r1 r2
sκ= α‐s0
nκ= ‐n0
sκ= α‐s0
nκ= ‐n0
sκ= α‐s0
nκ= ‐n0
r1 r2
1/h=0
(a) Over-invested: 0 ≤ α ≤ si0
/
r2
s  s
 
sκ   ‐s0
κ  ‐ 0
sκ   ‐s0‐ 0
κ    
sκ    
κ   ‐s0‐ 0
r1 r2
sκ=  ‐s0
κ  ‐ 0
sκ= 0
κ   ‐s0‐ 0
sκ= 0
κ   ‐s0‐ 0
r1 r2
sκ= α‐s0
nκ= ‐n0
sκ= α‐s0
nκ= ‐n0
sκ= α‐s0
nκ= ‐n0
(b) Over-invested: si0 < α ≤ si0+ni0
1/h=∞
r2
s=0 s≥0
n=0  n≥0
r1 r2
sκ= α‐s0
nκ= ‐n0
sκ= α‐s0‐n0
nκ= 0 
sκ= 0 
nκ= α‐s0‐n0
r1 r2
sκ= α‐s0
nκ= ‐n0
sκ= 0
nκ= α‐s0‐n0
sκ= 0
nκ= α‐s0‐n0
r1 r2
sκ= α‐s0
nκ= ‐n0
sκ= α‐s0
nκ= ‐n0
sκ= α‐s0
nκ= ‐n0
r1 r2
1/h=0
(c) Under-invested si0 +n
i
0 < α ≤ 1
Figure 3: Three regions of adjustment types along the discount rate axis defined by C1 and C2
for the cases where the decision-maker has over- and under-invested.
3.3 Optimal decision at t = 0
With the optimal adjustment decision at t = κ known, the discounted realised cost in
Eq. 6 is rewritten as
Ri = Ii0 +D
i
0 + I
ijmin
κ (15)
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The discounted realised cost is a random variable as it is a function of the random
variables κ and α. To derive the optimal investment decision t = 0 we need to first
determine the expected value of Ri, which is defined as
E[Ri] = E[Ii0] + E[D
i
0] + E[I
ijmin
κ ] (16)
We solve Eq. 16 for the defined exponential distribution of κ, however we do not yet
solve for the probability distribution of α, as this probability density function may
have different shapes depending on the focus of the climate change impact (i.e. peak
discharge, sea-level rise, etc.). As we consider the random variables κ and α to be
independent random variables, the joint probability distribution of κ and α can be
written as the product of the probability distribution of κ and α (f(κ, α) = f(κ)f(α)).
The expected discounted investment cost (E[Ii0]) is a function of {s0, n0}i:
E[Ii0] =
∫ ∞
0
Ii0f(κ)dκ
= Css
i
0 + Cnn
i
0 +
(
1
h+ r
)
(css
i
0 + cnn
i
0) (17)
The expected discounted damage cost (E[Di0]) is a function of {s0, n0}i:
E[Di0] =
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
0
Di0f(κ)f(α)dκdα
=
(
1
h+ r
)∫ 1
0
D(α, si0, ni0)f(α)dα (18)
The expected optimal discounted adjustment cost (E[Iijminκ ]) is a function of {s0, n0}i
and the combination of C1 and C2:
E[Iijminκ ] =
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
0
Aijminκ e
−rκf(κ)f(α)dκdα
=
(
h
h+ r
)∫ 1
0
Aijminκ f(α)dα (19)
With Eq. 17 to 19, we can derive the optimal investment decision at t = 0 for a given
Cs, cs, Cn, cn, r, h, D and f(α). The optimal investment decision at t = 0 is denoted
as {s0, n0}imin , and is defined as the minimisation of the expected discounted realised
15
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costs, i.e. E[Rimin ],
E[Rimin ] = min
{
E[R1], ..., E[Ri], ..., E[RN ]
}
(20)
The decision maker will prefer an investment in structural measures to minimise the
expected discounted investment costs at t = 0 (E[Ii0]), if Ch2 < 0, which is defined as
Ch2 = Cs +
cs
h+ r
− Cn − cn
h+ r
(21)
If Ch2 < 0, then the fixed cost plus present value of the annual costs up to the expected
waiting time for resolution of uncertainty is smaller for structural measures than for
non-structural measures. If the expected waiting time for resolution of uncertainty (1/h)
approaches infinity than, Ch2 approaches C2, defined in Eq. 11. Since Ch2 is a function of
the discount rate (r) and the expected waiting time for resolution of uncertainty (1/h),
two regions of investment types at t = 0 that minimise E[Ii0] can be defined in the plane
spanned by r and 1/h. This is shown in Figure 4. If 1/h = 0, only the fixed costs
are relevant. Since Cs > Cn, non-structural measures are preferred. As 1/h increases,
the contribution of the annual costs increases. Since cn > cs, non-structural measures
become less preferable.
The optimal investment decision at t = 0 that minimise E[Ri] will relate to the regions
defined by Ch2 in Figure 4 and by C1 and C2 in Figure 3. This will be illustrated by
numerical examples in the next section.
1/h=0
1/h=∞
r2
s=0 s≥0
n=0  n≥0
r1 r2=r6
sκ= 0 
nκ= α‐s0‐n0
Ks‐Kn=0
r1 r2
sκ= α‐s0
nκ=‐n0
sκ= α‐s0
nκ =‐n0
sκ= α‐s0
nκ =‐n0
r1 r2
r1 r2
sκ= 0 
nκ= α‐s0‐n0
r6Figure 4: Two regions of investment types at t = 0 that minimise E[Ii0]. Defined by Ch2
in the plane spanned by the discount rate (r) and the expected waiting time for resolution of
uncertainty (1/h).
16
CICERO Working Paper 2012:01
3.4 Numerical examples
In this section we further illustrate the continuous-state two-period model. A uniform
probability distribution for α and an increasing and concave damage function are ap-
plied. The damage function is given by:
D(α, s0, n0) =
{
Dmax
√
α− s0 − n0 α− s0 − n0 > 0
0 α− s0 − n0 ≤ 0
If α > s0 + n0, the decision-maker has under-invested and there are damage costs. A
motivation for this functional form is provided in Appendix A. The resulting expressions
for the expected discounted realised cost (Eq. 16, 17, 18 and 19) are programmed in
MATLAB, and minimised for a range of {s0, n0}i, given the constraints 0 ≤ si0 ≤ 1,
0 ≤ ni0 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ si0 + ni0 ≤ 1.
Three examples will be presented to illustrate how the combination of C1 and C2 influ-
ences the optimal investment decision at t = 0. The absolute value of the cost function
parameters (Cs, Cn, cs, cn and Dmax) used in these examples are not important. It is
their relation that is of interest for this illustration. The optimal investment decision at
t = 0 will be presented for a range of plausible parameter values for r and h. Specifi-
cally, we assess results for the intervals r ∈ (0, 0.1] and h ∈ [0.01, 1]. The interval for r
implies that we check solutions for non-negative discount rates up to 10%. The interval
for h implies that we check solutions where the expected waiting time for resolution of
uncertainty is between 1 year and 100 years.
3.4.1 Example 1.
In the first example the cost function parameters are selected such that C1 < 0 (and
thus C2 < 0) for the complete range of r. For illustration, we chose the following values,
Cs = 1000 e, Cn = 500 e, cs = 150 e and cn = 250 e. We consider two values of Dmax,
namely 750 e and 1500 e, to demonstrate the effect of increasing maximum annual
flood damage on the optimal decision. Figure 5 and 6 present the resulting optimal
investment decision at t = 0 as function of r and h.
Since C1 < 0 and C2 < 0, the focus of the optimal decision at t = 0 will be on structural
measures. This can be seen in Figure 5. No investment in non-structural measures is
made at t = 0. Investing in non-structural measures becomes more desirable as damage
costs increase, as shown by Figure 6. The relatively high non-structural costs become
justifiable when the damages increase. The damage costs will be set to zero at the
17
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moment uncertainty is resolved (t = κ).
Moreover the results demonstrate that if 1/h increases the investment in structural
measures increases. When 1/h increases the expected waiting time for resolution of un-
certainty is longer, and accordingly the period of possible damages is longer. Therefore,
the investment in structural measures will increase to avoid a long period of possible
damages. This effect becomes smaller when the discount rate increases. If the discount
rate increases, future costs receive less weight, therefore the stream of damage costs
receives less weight, and the investment in structural measures will increase less. In-
vestment in structural measures increases stronger with lower discount rates and longer
expected waiting time for resolution of uncertainty.
The non-structural measures, on the other hand, increase first and then decrease again
if 1/h increases. This is related to the period of possible damages and the fact that non-
structural measures become optimal to minimize E[Ii0] for small 1/h. As the period of
possible damage increases, the relatively high non-structural annual costs become justi-
fiable. However, if this period further increases, the relative high annual non-structural
costs are no longer justifiable. It is better to increase the structural measures. If the
damages costs decreases it is not justifiable to invest first in non-structural measures
- although it is optimal to minimize E[Ii0] for small 1/h - as they will be reduced at the
moment uncertainty is resolved. This is reflected in Figure 5 and 6.
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Figure 5: Example 1. Optimal investment decision at t = 0 as a function of discount rate r
and hazard rate (1/h). Cs = 1000 e, Cn = 500 e, cs = 150 e, cn = 250 e and Dmax = 750 e.
(Calculation based on step-size 0.001 for interval α.)
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Figure 6: Example 1. Optimal investment decision at t = 0 as a function of discount rate r
and hazard rate (1/h). Cs = 1000 e, Cn = 500 e, cs = 150 e, cn = 250 e and Dmax = 1500 e.
(Calculation based on step-size 0.001 for interval α.)
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3.4.2 Example 2.
In the second example the cost function parameters are selected such that C1 < 0
and C2 < 0 for r ∈ (0, 0.05], defined as region 1 and C1 ≥ 0 and C2 < 0 for r ∈
[0.05, 0.1], defined as region 2. For illustration, we chose the following values, Cs =
1000 e, Cn = 500 e, cs = 150 e and cn = 200 e. Two values of Dmax are considered:
750 e and 1500 e. Figure 7 and 8 present the resulting optimal investment decision at
t = 0 as function of r and h.
The results demonstrate that the optimal investment decision at t = 0 is differently
related to r and h for the two regions. Similar characteristics as discussed in the first
example, are present for r ∈ (0, 0.05]. For r ∈ [0.05, 0.1], it can be observed that it
becomes more favorable to invest in non-structural measures as r increases. Moreover,
the optimal investment decision at t = 0 depends less on the 1/h as r increases.
If C1 ≥ 0 then Cs + csr ≥ cnr , i.e. the fixed plus weighted annual costs of structural
measures are greater than or equal to the weighted annual costs of non-structural mea-
sures. If C2 < 0 then Cs + csr < Cn + cnr , i.e. the fixed plus weighted annual costs of
structural measures are smaller than those of non-structural measures. For the optimal
decision at t = 0, these conditions imply that it is still favorable to invest in structural
measures. However, as the discount rate increases, the difference between the fixed plus
weighted annual costs of the structural and non-structural measures becomes smaller,
making non-structural measures justifiable to reduce the damages. Especially for shorter
periods of possible damages (smaller 1/h) this becomes justifiable (see Figure 4). If the
decision-maker has over-invested, the best is to reduce the non-structural measures (as
cn > cs) and let the structural measures unchanged (see Figure 3). Therefore, non-
structural measures at t = 0 are justifiable if the damage costs increase and the period
of possible damages is smaller, such that the annual costs can be limited. The second
region can be considered as a transition zone. This is illustrated by the next example.
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Figure 7: Example 2. Optimal investment decision at t = 0 as a function of discount rate r
and hazard rate (1/h). Cs = 1000 e, Cn = 500 e, cs = 150 e, cn = 200 e and Dmax = 750 e.
(Calculation based on step-size 0.001 for interval α.)
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Figure 8: Example 2. Optimal investment decision at t = 0 as a function of discount rate r
and hazard rate (1/h). Cs = 1000 e, Cn = 500 e, cs = 150 e, cn = 200 e and Dmax = 1500 e.
(Calculation based on step-size 0.001 for interval α.)
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3.4.3 Example 3.
In the third example the cost function parameters are selected such that C1 < 0 and
C2 < 0 for r ∈ (0, 0.025] (region 1), C1 ≥ 0 and C2 < 0 for r ∈ [0.025, 0.05] (region 2) and
C1 ≥ 0 and C2 ≥ 0 for r ∈ [0.05, 0.1] (region 3). For illustration, we chose the following
values, Cs = 1000 e, Cn = 500 e, cs = 175 e and cn = 200 e. Two values of Dmax are
considered: 750 e and 1500 e. Figure 9 and 10 present the resulting optimal investment
decision at t = 0 as function of r and h.
The results demonstrate that the optimal investment decision at t = 0 is different
related to r and h for these three regions. Similar characteristics discussed in the first
and second example, are present for r ∈ (0, 0.025] and r ∈ [0.025, 0.05], respectively.
For r ∈ [0.05, 0.1], it can be observed that it is favorable to invest in non-structural
measures.
If C1 ≥ 0 then Cs + csr ≥ cnr , i.e. the fixed plus weighted annual costs of structural
measures are greater than or equal to the weighted annual costs of non-structural mea-
sures. If C2 ≥ 0 then Cs + csr ≥ Cn + cnr , i.e. the fixed plus weighted annual costs of
structural measures are greater than or equal to those of non-structural measures. For
the optimal decision at t = 0, these conditions imply that it is favorable to invest in
non-structural measures. The relatively high structural costs become unjustifiable. If
the damages increase, the non-structural measures will further increase.
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Figure 9: Example 3. Optimal investment decision at t = 0 as a function of discount rate r
and hazard rate (1/h). Cs = 1000 e, Cn = 500 e, cs = 175 e, cn = 200 e and Dmax = 750 e.
(Calculation based on step-size 0.001 for interval α.)
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Figure 10: Example 3. Optimal investment decision at t = 0 as a function of discount rate r
and hazard rate (1/h). Cs = 1000 e, Cn = 500 e, cs = 175 e, cn = 200 e and Dmax = 1500 e.
(Calculation based on step-size 0.001 for interval α.)
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4 Continuous-state three-period model
In this section we expand upon the two-period model by considering an intermediate
decision moment at which there is partial resolution of climate change uncertainty. This
is a natural extension of our analysis given that the resolution of the uncertainty of
climate change impacts on river flow is a gradual process and the decision-maker will
have additional opportunities to adjust his initial investment decision. For the three-
period model, an investment decision is made at t = 0 and an adjustment decision,
under full resolution of climate change uncertainty, is made at an unknown future time
t = κ. This unknown future moment is equal to the full resolution moment in the
continuous-state two-period model, therefore κ has the same probability distribution,
i.e. an exponentially distributed with f(κ) = he−hκ, such that E[κ] = 1/h, where h
is denoted as the hazard rate. At an intermediate decision moment, defined as t = xκ
partial resolution of uncertainty is used to make an additional investment decision. Note
that x is a fraction, where x ∈ (0, 1). From todays perspective, this moment is unknown
as also t = κ is unknown. The decision-maker defines his investment strategy based
on the expected value t = κ and thus t = xκ, i.e. 1/h and x/h, respectively. If the
decision-maker sets x equal to 0.2 today, he will use the information about the partial
resolution of climate change uncertainty at 20% of the expected waiting time of full
resolution 1/h. Therefore, this model focuses on the effect of the use of intermediate
information.4
Figure 11 shows the decision tree for the continuous-state three-period model. The
decision problem is solved backward. The decision node on the far right indicates the
decision for sκ and nκ at t = κ when a combination of s0, n0, sxκ and nxκ has been
chosen and α is known, based on the reduced range of α resulting from partial resolution
of uncertainty (circular information node on the right). The decision node in the middle
of the decision tree indicates the decision for sxκ and nxκ at t = xκ when a combination
of s0 and n0 has been chosen and the probability distribution of α is updated based
on the received evidence range w (indicated by the two circular information nodes on
the left). The decision node on the left represents the objective of the decision-maker
to choose the combination of s0 and n0 in order to minimise the path outcome of the
decision tree.
In the following subsections, we will present a specific decision path of the decision tree
following a backward procedure. This includes the optimal adjustment at t = κ, the
4Note that the intermediate information is not used to update the expected time of full resolution.
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optimal decision at t = xκ and the optimal decision at t = 0. Next, the process of
gradual resolution of uncertainty that leads to an update of the prior distribution of α
for partial resolution of climate change uncertainty is explained. Furthermore, we show
that the continuous-state two-period model is a special case of the continuous-state
three-period model and present numerical examples.
t = 0 t = xκ
{sκ}1
{ }1
t = κ
{s0,n0}1
{s0,n0}2
Rijl
{sκ}2
{sκ}lα = 1
sxκ,nxκ
{sxκ,nxκ}2w = 1
α = α
{s0,n0}i
{s0,n0}N‐1
{sκ}L‐1
{sκ}L
α = 0
{sxκ,nxκ}j
{sxκ,nxκ}M‐1
w = 0
α = α
{s0,n0}N
{sxκ,nxκ}M
Figure 11: Decision tree for continuous-state three-period model.
4.1 Specific decision path
We now highlight a specific path of the decision tree that leads to the outcome Rijl to
indicate how the discounted realised cost is derived. The stream of costs is discounted
for a specific {s0, n0}i, {sxκ, nxκ}j , {sκ}l, α, x and κ. The discounted realised cost Rijl
is defined as
Rijl = Ii0 +D
i
0 + I
ij
xκ +D
ij
xκ + I
ijl
κ (22)
which includes the discounted investment and damage cost from t = 0 up to t = xκ
(Ii0 and D
i
0), the discounted adjustment and damage cost from t = xκ up to t = κ (I
ij
xκ
and Dijxκ). Further, it includes the discounted adjustment cost for the period starting
at t = κ (Iijlκ ). The damage cost from t = κ onwards is zero as we assume optimal
adjustment at t = κ.
The discounted investment cost Ii0 is a function of {s0, n0}i and the random variable κ:
Ii0 = Css
i
0 + Cnn
i
0 +
∫ xκ
0
(
css
i
0 + cnn
i
0
)
e−rtdt
= Css
i
0 + Cnn
i
0 +
(
css
i
0 + cnn
i
0
r
)
(1− e−rxκ) (23)
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The discounted damage cost Di0 is a function of {s0, n0}i and the random variables κ
and α:
Di0 =
∫ xκ
0
D(α, si0, ni0)e−rtdt
=
D(α, si0, ni0)
r
(1− e−rxκ) (24)
The discounted adjustment cost Iijxκ is a function of {s0, n0}i, {sxκ, nxκ}j and the random
variable κ:
Iijxκ =
(
Cs max
{
0, sjxκ
}
+ Cn max
{
0, njxκ
})
e−rxκ
+
∫ κ
xκ
(
cs(s
i
0 + s
j
xκ) + cn(n
i
0 + n
j
xκ)
)
e−rtdt
=
(
Cs max
{
0, sjxκ
}
+ Cn max
{
0, njxκ
})
e−rxκ
+
(
cs
r
(si0 + s
j
xκ) +
cn
r
(ni0 + n
j
xκ)
)
(e−rxκ − e−rκ) (25)
Note that si0 + s
j
xκ ≥ 0 and ni0 +njxκ ≥ 0. The discounted damage cost Dijxκ is a function
of {s0, n0}i, {sxκ, nxκ}j and the random variables κ and α:
Dijxκ =
∫ κ
xκ
D(α, si0, ni0, sjxκ, njxκ)e−rtdt
=
D(α, si0, ni0, sjxκ, njxκ)
r
(e−rxκ − e−rκ) (26)
Finally, the discounted adjustment cost Iijlκ is a function of {s0, n0}i, {sxκ, nxκ}j , {sκ}l
and the random variables κ and α:
Iijlκ =
(
Cs max
{
0, slκ
}
+ Cn max
{
0, nlκ
})
e−rκ
+
∫ ∞
κ
(
cs
(
si0 + s
j
xκ + s
l
κ
)
+ cn
(
ni0 + n
j
xκ + n
l
κ
))
e−rtdt
=
(
Cs max
{
0, slκ
}
+ Cn max
{
0, α− si0 − ni0 − sjxκ − njxκ − slκ
})
e−rκ
+
(cs
r
(
si0 + s
j
xκ + s
l
κ
)
+
cn
r
(
α− si0 − sjxκ − slκ
))
e−rκ (27)
Note that si0 + s
j
xκ + slκ ≥ 0 and ni0 + njxκ + nlκ ≥ 0.
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4.2 Optimal adjustment at t = κ
As we follow a backward procedure, similar to the continuous-state two-period model,
the focus is first on the optimal decision at t = κ, denoted as {sκ}lmin and is defined
as the minimisation of the discounted adjustment cost, i.e. Iijlminκ . Therefore, I
ijl
κ is
minimised over all possible values of {sκ}l for a given {s0, n0}i, {sxκ, nxκ}j and α.
Eq. 27 is rewritten as Iijlκ = A
ijl
κ e−rκ, where Aijlκ is a function of C1 = Cs + csr − cnr and
C2 = Cs+ csr −Cn− cnr . For each combination of C1 and C2, the minimum Aijlκ is defined
by how the level of α relates to the investment decision made at t = 0 and t = xκ,
{s0 + sxκ, n0 + nxκ}ij , i.e. if the decision-maker has over- or under-invested. This can
be summarized as follows:
1. C1 < 0 and C2 < 0
Aijlminκ =

cs
r α 0 ≤ α ≤ sij
Cs(α− sij) + csr α sij < α ≤ sij + nij
Cs(α− sij) + csr α sij + nij < α ≤ 1
(28)
2. C1 ≥ 0 and C2 < 0
Aijlminκ =

cs
r α 0 ≤ α ≤ sij
cs
r s
ij + cnr (α− sij) sij < α ≤ sij + nij
Cs(α− sij − nij) + csr (α− nij) + cnr nij sij + nij < α ≤ 1
(29)
3. C1 ≥ 0 and C2 ≥ 0
Aijlminκ =

cs
r α 0 ≤ α ≤ sij
cs
r s
ij + cnr (α− sij) sij < α ≤ sij + nij
Cn(α− sij − nij) + csr sij + cnr (α− nij) sij + nij < α ≤ 1
(30)
where sij = si0 + s
j
xκ and n
ij = ni0 + n
j
xκ
If C1 < 0 and C2 < 0 then the optimal adjustment decision at t = κ is to reduce the
investment in the non-structural measures as much as possible, i.e. nlκ = −nij and
invest only in structural measures. Moreover, if 0 ≤ α ≤ sij the decision-maker has
over-invested and the structural measures are therefore reduced: slκ = α−sij . Reducing
structural measures leads to a reduction in the annual costs, but, it does not imply that
the initial investment is removed. On the other hand, if sij < α ≤ 1 the decision-maker
has under-invested, there are damages incurred and at t = κ, he will further invest
only in structural measures slκ = α − sij . Note that in all cases it is required that
−sij ≤ slκ ≤ α− sij because sij + slκ ≥ 0 and nij + nlκ ≥ 0.
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4.3 Optimal decision at t = xκ
With the optimal adjustment decision at t = κ known, the discounted realised cost in
Eq. 22 is rewritten as
Rij = Ii0 +D
i
0 + I
ij
xκ +D
ij
xκ + I
ijlmin
κ
= Ii0 +D
i
0 +R
j|i (31)
The focus is now on the optimal discounted cost at t = xκ (Rj|i), which is a random
variable as it is a function of the random variables κ and α. To derive the optimal
investment decision t = xκ we need to first determine the expected value of Rj|i, which
is defined as
E[Rj|i] = E[Iijxκ] + E[D
ij
xκ] + E[I
ijlmin
κ ] (32)
We consider the random variables κ and α to be independent random variable. The
random variable α is conditioned on evidence for α, i.e. w. The joint probability
function of Rj|i is therefore given by: f(κ, α|w) = f(κ)f(α|w).
The expected discounted investment cost (E[Iijxκ]) is a function of {s0, n0}i and {sxκ, nxκ}j :
E[Iijxκ] =
∫ ∞
0
Iijxκf(κ)dκ
=
h
(h+ xr)
(
Cs max
{
0, sjxκ
}
+ Cn max
{
0, njxκ
})
+
(1− x)h
(h+ xr)(h+ r)
(
cs(s
i
0 + s
j
xκ) + cn(n
i
0 + n
j
xκ)
)
(33)
The expected discounted damage cost (E[Dijxκ]) is a function of {s0, n0}i, {sxκ, nxκ}j
and evidence for α, i.e. w:
E[Dijxκ] =
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
0
Dijxκf(κ)f(α|w)dκdα
=
(1− x)h
(h+ xr)(h+ r)
∫ 1
0
D(α, si0, ni0, sjxκ, njxκ)f(α|w)dα (34)
The expected optimal discounted adjustment cost (E[Iijlminκ ]) is a function of {s0, n0}i,
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{sxκ, nxκ}j , evidence for α, i.e. w, and the combination of C1 and C2:
E[Iijlminκ ] =
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
0
Aijlminκ e
−rκf(κ)f(α|w)dκdα
=
h
h+ r
∫ 1
0
Aijlminκ f(α|w)dα (35)
With Eq. 33 to 35, we can derive the optimal adjustment decision at t = xκ for a given
{s0, n0}i, Cs, cs, Cn, cn, r, h, D, x, w and f(α|w). The optimal adjustment decision at
t = xκ is denoted as {sxκ, nxκ}ijmin , and is defined as the minimisation of the expected
discounted costs at t = xκ, i.e. E[Rjmin|i],
E[Rjmin|i] = min
{
E[R1|i], ..., E[Rj|i], ..., E[RM |i]
}
(36)
4.4 Optimal decision at t = 0
With the optimal decisions at t = κ and t = xκ known, the discounted realised cost in
Eq. 31 is rewritten as
Ri = Ii0 +D
i
0 + E[R
jmin|i] (37)
The discounted realised costs is a random variable as Ii0 is a function of the random
variable xκ, Di0 is a function of the random variables xκ and α and E[R
jmin|i] is a
function of the random variable w, as there is not one evidence, but a range of evidence
of α at t = xκ possible. To derive the optimal investment decision t = 0, we first
determine the expected value of Ri, which is defined as:
E[Ri] = E[Ii0] + E[D
i
0] + E
[
E[Rjmin|i]
]
(38)
The expected discounted investment cost (E[Ii0]) is a function of {s0, n0}i:
E[Ii0] =
∫ ∞
0
Ii0f(κ)dκ
= Css
i
0 + Cnn
i
0 +
x
h+ xr
(css
i
0 + cnn
i
0) (39)
The expected discounted damage cost (E[Di0]) is a function of {s0, n0}i:
E[Di0] =
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
0
Di0f(κ)f(α)dκdα
=
x
h+ xr
∫ 1
0
D(α, si0, ni0)f(α)dα (40)
29
CICERO Working Paper 2012:01
The expected value of the minimum expected discounted costs at t = xκ is a function
of {s0, n0}i:
E
[
E[Rjmin|i]
]
=
∫ 1
0
E[Rjmin|i]f(w)dw (41)
With Eq. 39 to 41, we can derive the optimal investment decision at t = 0 for a given
Cs, cs, Cn, cn, r, h, D, x, f(w) and f(α). The decision is denoted as {s0, n0}imin , and
is defined as the minimisation of the expected discounted costs at t = 0, i.e. E[Rimin ],
E[Rimin ] = min
{
E[R1], ..., E[Ri], ..., E[RN ]
}
(42)
4.5 Gradual resolution of uncertainty
We further examine the probability functions f(α), f(w) and f(α|w), which are required
to define the optimal investment at t = 0. The conditional function of α, given a specific
value for the evidence w equals:
f(α|w) = f(α,w)
f(w)
, where α ∈ [0, 1] and w is a constant (43)
The conditional probability is proportional to the joint probability function of α and w,
where evidence w is fixed to a specific value. Given this evidence w, α is more likely to
occur, i.e. the universe is reduced. Therefore the joint probability function is divided
by f(w), the probability of this specific evidence. f(w), also denoted as the marginal
distribution, is found by integrating the joint probability function over the whole range
of α:
f(w) =
∫ 1
0
f(α,w)dα (44)
We could reverse the role of α and w in Eq. 43. The conditional probability of w given
a specific value of α would be
f(w|α) = f(α,w)
f(α)
which can be rewritten as: f(α,w) = f(w|α)f(α) (45)
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Substituting Eq. 44 and 45 into the definition of the conditional function of α, given a
specific value for evidence w, gives:
f(α|w) = f(w|α)f(α)∫ 1
0 f(w|α)f(α)dα
, α ∈ [0, 1] and w is a constant (46)
Eq. 46 is known as Bayes’ theorem (Bolstad, 2007). Bayes’ theorem is used to revise
our beliefs of α on the basis of evidence w. f(α) is the prior distribution for α. It gives
the weight we attach to each value of α from our prior belief. f(w|α) is the likelihood
for α and is the conditional probability that a specific evidence w has occurred given
each value of α. Finally, f(α|w) is the posterior distribution for α. It gives the weight
we attach to each value of α after we have observed a specific evidence w. The posterior
thus combines our prior beliefs with the evidence given by the occurrence of w:
posterior =
likelihood× prior∫
(likelihood× prior) (47)
4.5.1 Likelihood
The likelihood function that needs to be defined in a Bayesian framework, is based upon
an understanding of the evidence-generating process (Patwardhan and Small, 1992). We
need to evaluate the likelihood of a stream of evidence of climate induced annual flood
damages given a true state of climate induced annual flood damages. In general, we do
not directly obtain the stream of evidence of increased annual flood damages, because
we make associated observations, for example the annual peak discharges measured at
different measuring stations along rivers. The relationship between the associated ob-
servations and climate induced annual flood damages is defined by parametric models,
as shown in Figure 12. These parameters reflect the true state of the climate. Pat-
wardhan and Small (1992) explain the case of sea-level rise, where a relation is defined
between the long-term variation in global mean sea level change relative to a base year
and observations of relative sea level at different tide gauges stations around the world.
If such models were formulated, the likelihood of a stream of evidence of climate induced
annual flood damages given a true state of climate induced annual flood damages would
be defined by a Monte Carlo simulation of the model while varying the model parameters
for each possible true state of the climate.
For simplification we assume that the stream of evidence of climate induced annual flood
damages can directly be determined. The associated observations and the models are
therefore omitted. We denote the yearly determined evidence of climate induced annual
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Associated 
observations
Models
Evidence of 
climate induced 
annual flood damages
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parameters
Figure 12: Relationship between the associated observations and climate induced annual flood
damages
flood damages as yρ. This evidence has a normal distribution with mean α (the true
state) and variance σ2, i.e.
f(yρ|α) = 1√
2piσ
e−
1
2σ2
(yρ−α)2 (48)
The variance reflects the degree to which we are able to determine climate induced
annual flood damage. This variance is in expected terms proportional to the expected
arrival time of full information, i.e. 1/h, and can be compared to a measurement error of
an instrument. The smaller the variance, the more accurate the instrument. Likewise,
the better our capabilities to determine the climate induced annual flood damage, the
shorter the expected arrival time of full information. Through investment in research we
can enhance our capabilities to reduce the variance, however in this model the variance
is constant thus no additional research costs are specified.
Every year we determine evidence of climate induced annual flood damages in a similar
way, but independently from each other. This results in a sample (database) y1, . . . , yP ,
after P years. Each evidence has the same normal distribution with mean α and variance
σ2, because the true state and our capabilities to determine evidence are considered to
be constant over time. The joint likelihood of this sample after P years is the product of
the individual likelihoods, because each evidence is independent of the other evidence.
Using Eq. 48 and introducing the mean of the sample y¯ = 1P
∑P
ρ=1 yρ, gives:
f(y1, . . . , yP |α) = 1(√
2piσ
)P P∏
ρ=1
e−
1
2σ2
(yρ−α)2
=
1(√
2piσ
)P e− P2σ2 ( 1P ∑ y2ρ−y¯2)e− P2σ2 (α−y¯)2
= K(y1, . . . , yP )e
− P
2σ2
(y¯−α)2 (49)
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The posterior of α given the stream of evidence y1, . . . , yP , is accordingly (see Eq. 47):
f(α|y1, . . . , yP ) = e
− P
2σ2
(y¯−α)2f(α)∫ 1
0 e
− P
2σ2
(y¯−α)2f(α)dα
(50)
Note that the constant K drops out of the equation. Further, it is noted that the
likelihood of α is proportional to the distribution of the sample mean (y¯). The sample
mean (the sum of P independent normal distribution with mean α and variance σ2)
itself has a normal distribution with mean α but with variance σ˜2 = σ
2
P . Therefore,
the posterior of α given the evidence y¯ after P years follows the same equation as the
posterior of α given the stream of evidence y1, . . . , yP .
Finally, the sample mean after xκ years is denoted as w. Therefore, Eq. 46 becomes:
f(α|w) = e
− 1
2σ˜2
(w−α)2f(α)∫ 1
0 e
− 1
2σ˜2
(w−α)2f(α)dα
, α ∈ [0, 1] and w is a constant (51)
Full resolution of uncertainty is obtained when σ˜2 7→ 0. This would happen when we
determine evidence for infinity, P 7→ ∞. However, it is considered that at t = κ, σ˜
becomes small enough in order to be considered as full resolution. This threshold is
indicated by δ, thus at t = κ, σ˜ = δ. The variance of the sample mean after xκ years,
can therefore be defined as
σ˜2 =
σ2
xκ
=
δ2κ
xκ
, x ∈ [0, 1] (52)
As mentioned before, the variance of the evidence determined in year ρ, is proportional
to the year in which full resolution is considered (up to δ), i.e. σ2 ∝ κ. In expected
terms this implies that E[σ2] ∝ E[κ], which equals 1/h. This reflects the degree to
which we are able to determine evidence of climate induced annual flood damage.
The posterior of α as function of three different observation moments xκ is illustrated
in Figure 13 for evidence w = 0.3. Note that the prior of α is uniformly distributed,
where no value is favored over any other. The posterior is shown for x = 0.1, x = 0.5
and x = 0.9, and δ = 0.025. It shows that the posterior of α gradually reduces. For
example, if the expected arrival time of full information (1/h) is set at 50 years, then
already after 5 years there is a considerable reduction in uncertainty. In the decision
tree (Figure 11) this reduced area is indicated by α ∈ [α, α].
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In this study, one intermediate decision moment, t = xκ is considered where 0 < x < 1.
At t = 0, the distribution of α is given by the prior. At t = κ, the distribution of α is
not given by the posterior defined in Eq. 51 because full resolution is assumed in the
model. This is represented by the assumption that nκ = α− s0−n0− sxκ−nxκ− sκ at
full resolution of uncertainty. The posterior formulated in Eq. 51 is therefore only used
for the intermediate decision moment. As a consequence δ can be increased in order to
obtain a posterior with higher variance at t = xκ, without affecting the distribution of
α at t = κ.
The evidence w at t = xκ is used to update our prior belief about α and to make
an intermediate adjustment decision. This procedure at t = xκ is called a posterior
analysis. However, from the viewpoint at t = 0 different observations are possible at
t = xκ. Therefore, E[Rjmin|i] becomes a random variable as w becomes a random
variable from our viewpoint t = 0. This procedure at t = 0 is called the pre-posterior
analysis.
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Figure 13: Posterior of α as function of three observation moments xκ for evidence w = 0.3
4.5.2 The continuous-state two-period model, a special case
There is a gradual resolution of uncertainty both in the two-period and the three-period
model. The difference between the two models is that in case of the three-period model,
we make use of the partial resolution of uncertainty at t = xκ to adjust the investment
decision. Therefore, forcing {sxκ = 0, nxκ = 0} in the three-period model, i.e. making
no investment at t = xκ, should result in the same optimal investment at t = 0 as for
the two-period model. This can be shown in the following way.
It is shown that Eq. 38 equals Eq. 16 if {sxκ = 0, nxκ = 0}. The expected value of the
minimum expected discounted cost at t = xκ is first specified using Eq. 41, 33, 34 and 35.
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Note that superscript j0 indicates that no investment is made at t = xκ.
E
[
E[Rjmin|i]
]
=
∫ 1
0
(
E[Iij0xκ ] + E[D
ij0
xκ ] + E[I
ij0lmin
κ ]
)
f(w)dw (53)
=
(1− x)h
(h+ xr)(h+ r)
(
css
i
0 + cnn
i
0
)∫ 1
0
f(w)dw
+
(1− x)h
(h+ xr)(h+ r)
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
D(α, si0, ni0)f(α|w)f(w)dαdw
+
h
h+ r
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Aij0lminκ f(α|w)f(w)dαdw
Next we change the order of integration in Eq. 53. First we integrate to w for a fixed
α, resulting in the marginal distribution of α i.e.∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
D(α, si0, ni0)f(α|w)f(w)dαdw = ∫ 1
0
D(α, si0, ni0) ∫ 1
0
f(α|w)f(w)dwdα
=
∫ 1
0
D(α, si0, ni0)f(α)dα
Further, note that
∫ 1
0 f(w)dw = 1 and that A
ij0lmin
κ is equal to A
ijmin
κ in Eq. 12 to 14 of
the two-period model. Therefore, Eq. 53 becomes:
E
[
E[Rjmin|i]
]
=
(1− x)h
(h+ xr)(h+ r)
(
css
i
0 + cnn
i
0
)
+
(1− x)h
(h+ xr)(h+ r)
∫ 1
0
D(α, si0, ni0)f(α)dα
+
h
h+ r
∫ 1
0
Aijminκ f(α)dα (54)
Substituting this back in Eq. 38 and combining this with Eq. 39 and 40, gives the
following equation for the expected discounted realised cost Ri:
E[Ri] = Css
i
0 + Cnn
i
0 +
( x
h+ xr
+
(1− x)h
(h+ xr)(h+ r)
)(
css
i
0 + cnn
i
0
)
+
( x
h+ xr
+
(1− x)h
(h+ xr)(h+ r)
)∫ 1
0
D(α, si0, ni0)f(α)dα
+
h
h+ r
∫ 1
0
Aijminκ f(α)dα (55)
As xh+xr +
(1−x)h
(h+xr)(h+r) =
1
h+r , the expected discounted realised cost in the three-period
model with {sxκ = 0, nxκ = 0}, is equal to the expected discounted realised cost in two-
35
CICERO Working Paper 2012:01
period model, given in Eq. 16 with Eq. 17, 18 and 19.
4.6 Numerical examples
We illustrate the three-period model using the same cost function parameters as in
example 2 in Section 3.4 (Figure 7 and 8), where Cs = 1000 e, Cn = 500 e, cs = 150 e,
cn = 200 e and two values of Dmax, 750 e and 1500 e. Due to the similar cost
structure, similar regions are present in Figure 14 to 17, where C1 < 0 and C2 < 0 for
r ∈ (0, 0.05] is defined as region 1 and C1 ≥ 0 and C2 < 0 for r ∈ [0.05, 0.1] is defined
as region 2. For region 1, this implies that structural measures are preferred over non-
structural measures. The non-structural measures first increase and then decrease if
1/h increases. As the period of possible damages increases, the relatively high annual
non-structural costs become justifiable. However, as this period further increases, the
relative high annual non-structural costs are no longer justifiable. It is better to increase
the structural measures. In region 2 it is still favorable to invest in structural measures.
However, non-structural measures are justifiable to reduce the damages if the discount
rate increases. The optimal investment decision depends less on the 1/h as r increases.
In the three-period model we introduce an intermediate decision moment (t = xκ),
where partial resolution of uncertainty is used. The decision-maker sets the fraction x,
which sets the moment at which partial resolution is used, relative to the moment of
full resolution of uncertainty. We illustrate two different intermediate decision moments,
namely x = 0.1 and x = 0.5 for a given expected value of the variance σ2, i.e. δ2/h.
The variance reflects the capacity to collect evidence to reduce the domain of the prior
distribution and is therefore proportional to the moment of full resolution of uncertainty.
With x = 0.1 the moment at which partial resolution of uncertainty is used, is set at 10%
of full resolution of uncertainty and with x = 0.5 at 50%. Figure 13 shows the posterior
distribution of α as a function of three different observation moments with δ = 0.025 for
a constant evidence w. From the t = 0 perspective we consider a continuum of w, as at
t = 0 we do not know the exact value of the evidence that will be made at this future
time instant.
Figure 14 and 15 present the resulting optimal investment decision at t = 0, for x = 0.1
as function of r and h. When compared to Figure 7 and 8 of the two-period model it
is noted that the total investment in structural and non-structural measures decreases.
The intermediate adjustment of the initial investment decision based on reduced area
α ∈ [α, α], reduces the stream of possible future damages, therefore at t = 0 with full
uncertainty, there is no need to over-invest as in the near future information becomes
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available. With low discount rates and smaller 1/h, there is less investment in non-
structural measures as future annual costs receive more weight. With high discount
rates and larger 1/h, investment in non-structural measures increases and structural
measures decreases. This is due to the high fixed investment costs of the structural
measures compared to the non-structural fixed investment costs, and future annual costs
receive less weight, which makes investment in non-structural measures more justifiable.
When the damage costs increase, with a low discount rate structural measures are
still preferred over non-structural measures. However, when the expected resolution
of uncertainty increases, investment in non-structural measures becomes justifiable as
the period of possible damage increases. When the period of possible damages further
increases (larger 1/h), the high annual costs of the non-structural measures receive more
weight, this leads to a reduction of non-structural measures and an increase in investment
in structural measures. When the damage costs increase, the transition of investment in
non-structural measures, at low discount rates, shifts upwards as the level of damages
does not justify investment in non-structural measures.
When we consider the intermediate decision moment at t = 0.5κ, and compare Figure 16
and 17 with Figure 7 and 8, there is considerably less difference. With x = 0.5 partial
resolution of uncertainty is used at 50% of the expected full resolution of uncertainty. At
this intermediate time instant we have a posterior distribution that has a smaller reduced
area α ∈ [α, α], indicating less uncertainty, thus we have a more optimal adjustment of
the initial investment decision than when x = 0.1. However, we only benefit from this
adjustment for a short period, the period of reduced damages is shorter. Figure 16
and 17 show that the latter effect dominates, as the shrinking domain is less important
than the moment at which the partial resolution of uncertainty is used. The time to
the moment at which the partial resolution is used, is much longer, therefore the initial
investment decision does not differ much from the initial investment decision in the
two-period model. For a given σ (and thus δ and 1/h), which relates to the capacity to
collect evidence to reduce the domain of the prior distribution, the decision-maker can
influence the timing of the intermediate investment decision through the selection of x.
This choice impacts the level of reduced damages, which depends on the timing of the
intermediate decision and associated level of partial resolution. When the decision-maker
can influence the level of σ through additional research, there is a trade-off between the
cost of additional research and the level of reduced damages.
In this particular illustration we note that using the partial resolution at 10% of 1/h
already leads to a considerable reduced domain α ∈ [α, α]. This is due to the value of δ,
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where δ = 0.025 means that already at 10% of 1/h a large part of uncertainty is resolved.
This is shown in Figure 13, where the prior distribution of α is uniformly distributed
and the posterior of α for x = 0.1 already has a considerable reduced domain.
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Figure 14: Optimal investment decision at t = 0 as a function of discount rate r and hazard
rate (1/h). Cs = 1000 e, Cn = 500 e, cs = 150 e, cn = 200 e, Dmax = 750 e and x = 0.1, the
calculation is based on step-size 0.01 for interval α.
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Figure 15: Optimal investment decision at t = 0 as a function of discount rate r and hazard
rate (1/h). Cs = 1000 e, Cn = 500 e, cs = 150 e, cn = 200 e, Dmax = 1500 e and x = 0.1,
the calculation is based on step-size 0.01 for interval α.)
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Figure 16: Optimal investment decision at t = 0 as a function of discount rate r and hazard
rate (1/h). Cs = 1000 e, Cn = 500 e, cs = 150 e, cn = 200 e, Dmax = 750 e and x = 0.5, the
calculation is based on step-size 0.01 for interval α.
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Figure 17: Optimal investment decision at t = 0 as a function of discount rate r and hazard
rate (1/h). Cs = 1000 e, Cn = 500 e, cs = 150 e, cn = 200 e, Dmax = 1500 e and x = 0.5,
the calculation is based on step-size 0.01 for interval α.
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5 Implications for flood management
In this section we discuss the implications of the model outcome for decision-making in
flood management. We first relate our model results to real-world decision making in
flood protection. In the second part of this section we discuss four biases that could
occur in flood protection decision-making and show their implications in the context of
our model results.
5.1 Decision-making
Our definition of structural and non-structural measures—based on their ratio of fixed
costs relative to annual costs—is slightly different from the one used by for instance
Kundzewicz (2002, 2009). In this more general interpretation structural measures refer
to engineering solutions (e.g. dikes, dams, reservoirs, diversions, channels, flood-ways),
while non-structural measures refer to legislation, regulatory, and institutional solutions
(e.g. watershed and landscape management, laws and regulations, zoning, economic in-
struments, and early warning systems). Although engineering solutions often induce
relatively large fixed costs, this may not hold for all engineering solutions. A similar
observation can be made with respect to regulatory and institutional solutions. Hence,
while largely overlapping, the two definitions are not identical. Our definition of struc-
tural measures makes it possible to rank any set of measures according to their cost
structure, where one engineering solution can be considered more structural than an-
other (implying that it has a higher fixed-to-annual-costs ratio).
Over the last decades, flood management has shown a shift from structural to non-
structural approaches. In many cases, decision-makers have decided to invest in a mix
of both structural and non-structural measures. In the UK case, for instance, Penning-
Rowsell et al. (2006) discuss such a gradual shift in flood management policy through
the 20th century. This shift from structural flood defense to flood risk management was
stimulated by two major flood events in 1998 and 2000 (Tunstall et al., 2009). Although
it is impossible to foresee future policy changes, Penning-Rowsell et al. (2006) predict
a “greater reliance on a location-specific mix of non-structural and people-centred flood
mitigation actions, and lessening of the influence of traditional approaches”.
A similar shift has occurred in many other countries and basins, of which we mention
two. In Germany, after the 2002 floods in the Elbe, new concepts for flood protection
measures were developed, which included a combination of structural and non-structural
measures. These non-structural measures were said to focus on the prevention and
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mitigation of the impact of floods (Petrow et al., 2006). In Canada, flood management
reform was also triggered by major flood events. In this context, De Loe¨ (2000) states
that “responses to the flooding problem have evolved in Canada from an emphasis on
controlling ‘water out of place’ through structural measures such as dams and dikes,
to managing human behaviour using zoning to keep development away from hazardous
areas.”
The model shows that if climate change uncertainty is present, then non-structural
measures become a more attractive option for flood protection. This shift in flood man-
agement is ongoing in many countries. There is increasing attention for non-structural
measures in flood protection policy. Non-structural measures are often more flexible, less
committing, and more sustainable (Kundzewicz, 2002). These characteristics are impor-
tant, especially in the current context of uncertain impacts of climate change on flood
damage, as discussed in Section 1. Both the flexibility and the commitment argument
put forward by Kundzewicz (2002) show up as the key factors for investment decisions
in our model setting. In the examples listed above (Germany, UK, Canada), the effects
of climate change have entered the discussion on flood protection decision-making.
In conventional analyses of decision-making on flood protection, the role of uncertainty
has often been ignored. Brouwer and Van Ek (2004), for instance, analyse several flood
protection options in the context of a Dutch case study. They assess the trade-offs
between costs and benefits of three policy measures (dike heightening, land use change
and floodplain restoration), and conclude that the preference for one of these mea-
sures depends on the value attached to future ecological and socio-economic benefits.
They do not, however, consider how uncertainty would affect the attractiveness of these
measures. Current Dutch flood protection policies encompass a mix of structural and
non-structural measures, and the public debate on protection from flood events revolves
around the uncertainty of future flood events due to climate change. Without a doubt
this uncertainty affects the optimal investment decision. Rosenberg et al. (2010) argue
that for investments in storm-water infrastructure “the range of predicted change...is
much too large to provide a basis for engineering design”. This statement implies that
when the impacts of climate change are uncertain, no sound investment decision in flood
protection can be made. The results from our model, however, show that in the presence
of uncertainty about the range of predicted climate change, it is possible to determine
the optimal investment decision, where the prior distribution of α represents the prior
knowledge of the decision-maker. A uniform distribution was implemented to indicate
that no value is favored over any other. Furthermore, waiting for new information about
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climate change impacts, which reduces uncertainty, does not imply a complete postpone-
ment of the investment decision today. Depending on the level of uncertainty, though,
structural or non-structural measures may be preferred. Specifically, our model results
show that the decision-maker’s preference for structural and non-structural measures
depends on the combination of the cost structure of these measures, the level of the
discount rate and uncertainty due to climate change.
An additional factor that may lead to a preference for non-structural measures is the
short horizon of decision-makers in many institutional contexts. There is a disincentive
to invest in structural measures if most benefits of these investments will only occur
over a very long time horizon. Non-structural measures are more profitable in the short
run, in terms of lower investment costs and may therefore provide a politically feasible
alternative to structural measures.
5.2 Possible biases of decision-makers
The results of the three models developed in Sections 2–4 suggest that decision-makers
may be biased in four ways. A first bias is that decision-makers could mistakenly assume
a discrete set of states of nature (true or false) and ignore the continuous character of
these impacts. The consequences of this bias can be analysed using the models of
Sections 2 and 3. Clearly, if climate change is either true or false, this implies that
the decision-maker assumes that either α = 0 or α = 1, while in fact the full range of
values α ∈ [0, 1] is possible. This constraint on values of α gives more weight to the
two extreme values in the initial decision to invest. Due to concavity of the damage
function this leads to lower expected damages. Hence, this bias causes decision-makers
to under-invest.
A second bias is related to the damage function and is discussed by Petrow et al. (2006)
in the context of flood protection in the Elbe basin. They find that decision-makers in
the Elbe basin have focused too much on one possible flood scenario, corresponding to
the area affected by a 100-year return period flood. In the context of our model, decision-
makers may assume one damage estimate corresponding to one particular value of α,
instead of considering the full range of possible damage depending on the full range of
possible climate change impacts. The result of this bias is similar; it leads to under-
investment in flood protection measures.
A third bias occurs when decision-makers consider only one measure instead of a set of
possible structural and non-structural measures. Each combination of the discount rate
and climate change uncertainty implies a different optimal investment combination, as
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can be seen from the continuous models in Sections 3 and 4. Ignoring one (or more)
measures would yield a sub-optimal investment decision. Whether this implies too
much or too little investment in structural or non-structural measures depends on the
set of measures considered, as well as their cost structure. Our model results show
that ignoring one or more measures distorts the interplay between structural and non-
structural measures that is required for optimal investment.
A fourth and last bias is the incorrect assumption that uncertainty will be resolved
at once at a future date, while in reality this resolution is likely to be gradual. The
difference in results between Sections 3 and 4 illustrates the implications of this bias.
The optimal mix of structural and non-structural measures is affected by this bias. The
option of adjusting the investment decision when more information arrives induces lower
initial investments, however this depends on the timing of the intermediate investment
moment and the level of partial resolution revealed.
6 Conclusion
Climate change uncertainty affects the decision to invest in flood protection measures.
The model developed in this paper shows how an optimal investment strategy in flood
protection measures reduces the risk of under- or over-investment to the decision-maker.
Our results confirm the argument of Kundzewicz et al. (2010), who state that “flood pre-
paredness (adaptation) measures should consist of an optimal, site-specific, mix from the
menu of structural and non-structural measures”. We provide a theoretical foundation
for this argument using a model of decision-making under uncertainty. A combination
of the discount rate, climate change uncertainty, and the cost structure of structural
and non-structural measures determines the optimal mix of investments in these mea-
sures. Our model results predict that if climate change uncertainty is present, then
non-structural measures become a more attractive option for flood protection.
The results from our continuous-state two-period model show that the level of the op-
timal mix of the structural and non-structural measures is affected by the level of the
maximum annual flood damage and the expected arrival time of full resolution. If maxi-
mum annual flood damage and the expected arrival time of full resolution of uncertainty
increases, this leads to longer periods of possible damages, which increases the level of
the optimal mix of flood protection measures. The proportion of structural and non-
structural measures in the optimal policy is affected by the cost structure, discount rate
and expected arrival time of full resolution of climate change uncertainty. If the discount
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rate increases, this puts less weight on future costs, which decreases the investment in
structural measures and increases in non-structural measures.
In the three-period model, the inclusion of an intermediate decision moment, where
partial resolution of uncertainty is observed, leads to lower investments in structural
and non-structural measures. However, the level of reduced damages is impacted by
the timing of the intermediate investment moment and the level of partial resolution
revealed. If the intermediate investment decision is in the near future, only little evidence
is collected to update the prior distribution, thus only little knowledge about the true
state is revealed. Still the investment decision can be updated to reduce the stream of
possible future damages, therefore the initial investment decision is lower in anticipation
of the intermediate decision moment. If the intermediate investment decision is later
in time, more evidence is collected and the posterior distribution has a smaller range,
which comes closer to full resolution of uncertainty. However, as the period between the
initial investment moment and the intermediate moment is longer, the period of possible
damages is longer, thus a higher level of initial investment will be justified compared
to early partial resolution of uncertainty. When the decision-maker is able to increase
the capacity to reduce climate change uncertainty through additional research, there is
a trade-off between the cost of research and the level of reduced damages.
Thus, we conclude that the optimal investment decision today depends strongly on the
cost structure of the adaptation measures and the discount rate, especially the ratio
of fixed and weighted annual costs of the measures. We define the optimal investment
decision today as a specific mix of measures that minimizes the total expected net cost. A
higher level of annual flood damage and later resolution of uncertainty in time increases
the optimal investment decision. Furthermore, the optimal investment decision today
is influenced by the possibility of the decision-maker to adjust his decision at a future
moment in time.
Although we have used river flooding as our motivating example, the results of this
paper may apply more widely. A relevant application is coastal areas where climate
change induces uncertain sea-level rise and related flood events. Again, different types
of measures can be considered, that vary in their cost structure. Examples are dike
heightening, beach nourishment, and restrictions on development and land use.
One possible extension to our model relates to the distinction between structural and
non-structural flood protection measures. In this paper, we distinguished between the
two based on their cost structure only, so that the measures are perfect substitutes.
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Alternatively, the measures can be modeled as imperfect substitutes or as partly com-
plementary, so that the interplay between the two measures is taken into account.
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Appendix A
A motivation for the functional form of the function D(α, s, n), introduced in Section 3
is the following. Consider the capacity of existing flood protection measures to be based
on a known Gumbel distribution for peak flow discharge. The Gumbel distribution is a
commonly used distribution for the modeling of peak river flow. Its probability density
function is
g(w;µ, β) =
z exp(−z)
β
with z = exp
[
w − µ
β
]
, (56)
where w denotes peak discharge, β is the scale parameter and µ is the location parameter.
Without loss of generality, we assume that climate change affects the scale parameter
only, by scaling β by (1 + αγ), with γ > 0, such that (1 + αγ)β ≥ β.5 Climate change
leads to an increase of the scale parameter, implying ‘fatter tails’ in the distribution of
peak discharge. This corresponds to evidence on increased variance of peak river flow
(IPCC, 2007). The maximum increase in the scale parameter depends on the level of γ,
i.e. if γ = 1 the scale parameter is doubled at maximum. We assume that there is at
maximum one flood per year, correlating to that year’s peak discharge. In year t, peak
discharge w causes a flood if w > w, where w denotes the maximum capacity provided
by current protection measures. Damage from floods is increasing and concave in w−w,
so that we have the following damage function:
h(w,w) =
{
λ(w − w) if w > w ,
0 otherwise,
where λ(w−w) is increasing and concave. Expected damage D in a given year can now
be calculated as the integral of the damage function over the Gumbel distribution of w
(whose scale parameter is affected by α):
D =
∫ ∞
0
[h(w,w)] g(w)dw. (57)
5Alternatively we could have modified the location parameter µ so that average peak discharge
increases and thereby the probability of extreme peak discharges. Under our model assumptions, both
methods lead to a similar—concave—relation between α and D.
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Recall that we assumed that each combination of measures suffices to adapt to the
impacts of climate change if s + n ≥ α. This assumption allows us to use the dif-
ference of α and s + n in order to account for the mitigating effect of flood protec-
tion measures on damage. Hence we summarise the relation between climate change
impact α, flood protection measures s + n, and expected damage D in the function
D(α, s, n) = Dmax
√
α− s− n, that is increasing and concave in (α − s − n), with
D(α− s− n ≤ 0) = 0.6
6This requires that the damage function λ(w − w) is sufficiently concave.
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